Introduction
The concept of Ummah is one of the main articles of Islam. The Quran recognizes all believers regardless of their sex, ethnicity, nationality, economic status, disability, etc. as one universal community, ‘ummah.’ Just by looking at the community in which this unique concept was introduced -probably the first time in human history-, we can see what kind of historical and social revolution the Quran accomplished in the seventh century Arabian Peninsula, where the community was strictly tribal and extremely fragmented by several factors. That is why the importance of community and brotherhood under one God is promoted by the Quran[1] and practices of the Prophet (PBUH) throughout his mission. Therefore, it is an obligation upon us that we recognize this universal brotherhood among the believers who testify the Oneness of God and Muhammad’s (PBUH) Prophethood as the last and final Messenger of God.
On the other hand, it is in human nature that we all think differently. In many cases, we interpret a simple statement of a politician quite differently, let alone interpreting the Word of God with many layers of meaning and events that took place centuries ago and transmitted to us with little background detail. And also, it is a social fact with no exception that no religion, no ideology, no social/political movement, no philosophical school can keep its homogeneous unity as it is established. After the decease of their founders, they fragmentize, ramify, and split into different sects, schools, madhabs, and branches. Such as, the Quran and the events took place during the lifetime of the Prophet (PBUH), as well as the events in the following decades were interpreted differently by different scholars and resulted in the birth of several schools of thought and practice throughout Islamic history.
Thus, keeping these two seemingly contradictory facts in mind, how can we establish the ummah to actualize the will of God and also keep the freedom of following and practicing different schools, sects, madhabs and maybe none in Islam. In this paper, I will elaborate on the major points of dissidence between Sunni and Shia Islam and try to provide solutions to end this centuries-old conflict and establish a platform of dialog and respect between two communities from the perspective of Muslims living in the West.
Historical and Doctrinal Disagreements
In order to solve any problem, one must understand the problem thoroughly. Therefore, for a possible Sunni and Shi’a rapprochement, we must understand the roots of the divide very well and draft a reconciliation strategy that will target to ease these tensions. The three historical developments that shaped the Sunni and Shia split can be summarized as:
- The first point of disagreement between Sunni and Shi’a doctrines is the right of succession after the Prophet (PBUH). Shi’a believes that as the son in law of the Prophet and the father of the Prophet’s only progeny through his daughter Fatima (PBUH), it was Ali’s (PBUH) right to lead the recently established Islamic state. On the other hand, Sunnis believe that the election of Abu Bakr (PBUH) as a result of mini referendum among the companions of the Prophet at Saqifah was a legitimate election as well as Omar’s and Uthman’s appointments after him. Therefore, Shi’a sees the first three khalifs illegitimate because they usurped Ali’s right to govern and they vilify them.
- Maybe the most significant incident that ignited such a split is the Karbala incident where Husain (PBUH), the grandson of the Prophet, his family, and his companions were cruelly murdered by the army of the second Umayyad Caliph, Yezid (AD 680). Although the Sunnis condemn the murders as much as the Shi’a, the incident left a terrible mark in the memory of the supporters of Ali and his progeny (itra) later. “Every year during the first ten days of Muharram, extensive manifestations of grief occur in which the events at Karbala are re-enacted in dramatic passion plays (ta’ziya) that reach their climax in processions of self-flagellation.”[2]
- The third factor that fueled the Sunni-Shia separation was the oppressive regimes of the Umayyad and Abbasid dynasties. Although most of the Ahl al-Bayt imams didn’t claim the political power and chose to stay away from political struggles, they were seen as the potential leaders for a possible uprising by both the governments and their dissidents. Therefore, the Imams and their families have been oppressed and historically they have been the voice of the oppressed.
These three factors divided the early Muslim community as the supporters of Ali and the mainstream community which was later called ‘Sunni.’ The main difference between Sunni and Shia aqeedas is again in political nature rather than a theological one. “The conventional Sunni and Islamicist view is that after the death of Prophet, political power passed to the new head of state, the caliph; religious authority, however, came to an end because Prophet’s prophetic function cannot be transmitted.”[3] In this respect, Sunni belief is quasi-secular that political power and religious authority are two different things. Although the political leaders during the time of Umayyads, Abbasids, and later Ottomans were recognized as the Caliphs, Caliphate was considered as a political office and religious authority was always represented by the ulema, scholars.
On the other hand, Shi’is disagree with this post-prophetic authority. They maintain that the imam as the legitimate head of the community inherits both the political and religious authority of the Prophet. “They also claim that the Prophet publicly appointed Ali as the wasi (legatee or successor) by divine command; this happened at a place called Ghadir Khumm on his return from the Farewell Pilgrimage and was confirmed various other times.”[4] Shi’a constructed the concept of Imamate upon this notion. According to Shi’a creed, “God has on earth a hujja, a proof from the sons of Ali Ibn Abu Talib and the earth cannot be without a hujja. It is not for any believer to choose an imam by rational consideration (ra’y) or choice (ikhtiyar), God appoints him for us.”[5]
Matters of Confrontation
For a possible reconciliation between Sunnis and Shi’is, we must understand the practices that raise tensions on both sides. Maybe the most disturbing Shi’i tradition from Sunnis perspective is (at least for some of them) cursing companions of the Prophet that didn’t support Ali, especially the ones who voted for Abu Bakr at Saqifah. Rainer Brunner explains this custom among Shi’is as,
“In the Shiite opinion, the vast majority of the sahaba in the Saqifa and later refused to support ‘Ali’s claims to succession of the Prophet, and many, e.g. A’isha, even engaged in open struggle against him. In doing so, in the eyes of the Shia, they unambiguously broke away from Islam and joined the ranks of the hypocrites (munafiqun) and idols (tawàghìt, singular tàghùt) mentioned in the Quran. This anathema has been specifically directed at the caliphs Abù Bakr, Umar, and Uthman: since they refused to observe a divine order, their reigns are considered usurpations and, therefore, rejected (rafd). To dissociate oneself from this group (barà”a) and to curse them (sabb’la’n) has been a shibboleth among Shiites for centuries.”[6]
For example, until the Iranian revolution in 1979, the day of Omar’s assassination was celebrated among certain groups in Iran as a festival. Although the Shi’i authorities lately discourage these practices, they have not been completely disappeared.
The second Shi’i custom that disturbs the Sunnis most is the ta’ziya, the commemoration of Karbala incident. “Every year during the first ten days of Muharram, extensive manifestations
of grief occur in which the events at Karbalà are re-enacted in dramatic passion plays ta’ziya that reach their climax in processions of self-flagellation.”[7] Although Shi’is see the practice as a demonstration of piousness and devotion, Sunnis see the custom as abhorrent and bid’ah, (innovation).
The third Shi’i practice that is considered repulsive among Sunnis is the extreme importance given to the shrines of the Imams, their families, and other important figures in the Shi’a community. When I saw them in Iran the first time, I found them quite strange as well. As I traveled from Turkmenistan to Turkey via Iran, I saw hundreds of those shrines for the martyrs of Iran-Iraq war. Yet, we can see veneration of the graves of Sufi masters in the Sunni world, even though not to the same degree. This shrine cult is especially condemned by Salafis who destroyed the graves of all the companions of the Prophet in Medina.
Another Shi’i practice opposed by Sunnis is taqiyya (dissimulation). Because Shi’is were historically persecuted by Sunni rulers, in many cases they had to hide their beliefs. They also claim Ali Ibn Abu Talib unwillingly obeyed the Caliphs before him hiding his true intentions. Again, this issue is exaggerated among Sunnis because it is also permissible to conceal one’s faith if his/her life is in danger. Due to the importance given to taqiyya in Shi’a sources, Sunnis attribute insincerity and dishonesty to Shi’is.
The last factor that divides Sunnis and Shi’a is a matter of fiqh, Islamic law. Mu’tah, the temporary marriage is permissible in Shi’i fiqh, whereas Sunnis consider it prostitution under the guise of fake marriage. Again, this issue is exaggerated among Sunnis because a woman must still wait at least for three months to marry another man which refutes the accusations of prostitution.
Rapprochement Efforts in History
Maybe the most critical aspect in Sunni and Shi’i rapprochement which both sides must keep in mind is the fact that both doctrines were shaped several centuries after the Prophet and the four caliphs. Watt traces back the emergence of the concept of Imamate back to the early 900s.[8] It is again in the same period, Sunnis started to refer themselves as Sunnis and Shi’is as Rafidites. As Fazlur Rahman points out throughout history by Sunnism, Sufism, or Shiism we have created religions not only within the religion but above the religion. And the “Islam” as the Prophet and his companions understood and practiced it, was much more inclusive, much more tolerant, and much more universal.
After the conceptualization of Shi’ism as a separate school in the tenth century and its implementation as a strict state ideology by Safavids in the sixteenth century, there have been several rapprochement efforts that aimed to bring these two schools together. The first significant effort was Nadir Shah’s attempt by convening Sunni and Shi’i scholars in Najaf in 1743 for a conference. The main goal of the conference was to have Shi’ism recognized as the fifth legitimate madhab in the Sunni world and having Jafar as-Sadiq who is equally respected by Sunnis recognized as the founder of Shi’ism. However, his real motive was political rather than theological, aiming to solidify his reign among the Sunni population of Afghanistan and the Shi’i population of Iran. To ease the tension between Sunnis and Shi’is as opposed to his predecessors, Safavids, he forbade publicly vilification of the first three Khalifs and allowed even promoted pilgrimage of Shi’i shrines. Although he called representation from Ottoman’s, they didn’t send anybody to participate in the conference. He also pleaded from Ottomans to have a fifth pulpit in Ka’ba representing Shi’is along with the four Sunni madhabs. Unfortunately, his attempts have not been recognized in the Sunni world especially by Ottomans, and after his assassination, four years later, his successors did not continue his vision.
The second most significant rapprochement attempt took place in the 1950s at Al-Azhar University. In 1957 after the enactment of Egypt’s constitution, Jamal Abd al-Nasir appointed Mahmut Shaltut to the head of Al-Azhar University. Mahmut Shaltut had previously worked at the Taqrib (unification) Society and was known with his ideas of rapprochement. At the peak of his prestige and power, Jamal al-Din Nasir’s goal by rapprochement was playing for the leadership of the Islamic world. Right after his appointment, Shaltut gave a series of interviews to the newspapers in Egypt, Lebanon, and Iran. In his interview on July 5, 1959, he gave to a Lebanese newspaper, Shaltut made two major declarations which were later considered as fatwas.
“Islam does not oblige any of its adherents to be affiliated with aspecific madhhab. Rather, we say: Every Muslim has, first of all, the right to follow any of the legal schools that have been properly handed down and whose rules in their specific (legal) effects are laid down in writing. A person who follows one of these schools is entitled to turn to any other without being subjected to reproach. In the sense of the religious law of Islam (shar’an), it is allowed to perform the divine service (ta’abbud) in accordance with the rite of the Ja’fariyya, which is known as Shì’a imamiyya, in the same way as in accordance with all schools of the Sunnis.”[9]
As much as Shaltut’s fatwa created great enthusiasm in the Shia world, it became under fire from Salafi-Wahhabi scholars. Shi’is expectation was the establishment of a Jafari/Zaydi school of fiqh in al-Azhar’s Shari’a Department as the fifth legitimate school. However, the excitement didn’t last too long. After Iran recognized the state of Israel, Iran’s, and thus Shi’is’ image severely damaged in Egypt and the Azhar’s Dean of the Sharia school had to call off any prospects for a separate school for Zaydi/Jafa’ri fiqh.
Rapprochement Efforts in the Twenty-First Century
In the last decades, there have been several encouraging steps towards Sunni-Shi’a rapprochement. In 2004, with the initiatives of King Abdullah of Jordan, a statement of intra-faith tolerance and unity was declared. More than 200 prominent Sunni and Shi’i scholars and organizations from all over the world endorsed the statement, which is called The Amman Message.[10] The statement recognized the adherents of any of the eight madhabs (Hanafi, Maliki, Safi’i, Hanbali, Ja’fari, Zaydi, Zahiri, and Ibadi) as Muslims and forbade declaring apostate the followers of these madhabs, and anybody who identifies himself as Sufi or Salafi, as well as any others who claim to be Muslim.
In 2007, The Muslim Public Affairs Council in the US also published a declaration called the Muslim Code of Honor which points out the increasing sectarian violence in Iraq and calls all Muslims in the world and especially the Muslim Americans for intra-faith dialog and tolerance. The Code of Honor again forbids charging anybody with disbelief who “believes in the oneness and supremacy of Allah, in Prophet Muhammad (peace be upon him) as the seal of the prophets and the last receiver of divine scripture, and in the viability and authenticity of the Glorious Quran, and who faces the qibla (direction of the Kaaba) in prayers.”[11]
Also, in 2018, the Shi’a Muslim Council of Southern California organized a symposium in collaboration with its partners, Islamic Shura Council of Southern California, CAIR, MPAC, and Bayan Claremont. The symposium hosted several prominent scholars such as Dr. Sayyid M. Syeed (ISNA), Dr. Liyakat Takim (McMaster University), Dr. Najeeba Syeed (Claremont School of Theology) and Dr. Sayed Moustafa al-Qazwini (Shia Muslim Council). The event was moderated by Dr. Hasnain Walji (United Global Initiative) and Dr. Sana Tayyen (University of Redlands). The symposium “provided an opportunity for attendees to observe how scholars and leaders conduct emphatic conversations that enhance understanding and lead us from tolerance to embrace diversity. Overall, the event was a success, providing the community with a clear message from the leaders of major Muslim organizations in Southern California.”[12]
The Roadmap
As I mentioned at the beginning of my paper, any rapprochement endeavors without recognizing the aforementioned differences are bound to fail. As Hamid Mavani states “No meaningful reconciliation can take place without addressing these vital issues and accepting the other as equal, both of which mean going beyond tolerance and toleration”[13] Thus, the goal of rapprochement should never be converting the adherents of one sect to the other. Nor should it be proving one’s superiority to the other. The aim of the Sunni-Shi’a rapprochement must be accepting the other as they are and respecting their views. Basically, it must be agreeing on disagreeing. That is why it has a better chance in the West where diversity is celebrated, rather than in the oppressive Muslim-majority countries that are still trying to build homogenous citizens for the post-colonial nation-states.
To look at the Sunni-Shi’a schism objectively without our cultural baggage, we have to go back to the essentials of the deen as it was proclaimed by the Prophet. I believe going back to essentials is not only crucial for Sunni-Shia rapprochement but also it is vital for an Islamic revival in the twenty-first century. Because in its current status, ‘the Islamic World’[14] is socially, politically, morally in rack and ruins and has nothing to offer to the rest of the world in terms of human rights, Democracy, universal moral values, science and most importantly peace, let alone the representation of Allah’s Messenger and His last revelation to the humanity. As we go to the fundamentals of the religion as it is proclaimed in the Quran and the most authentic hadiths I think, not only the Sunni-Shia schism will lose its significance but also the differences between the four Sunni madhabs will be insignificant and irrelevant which is already happening in the West today. I suspect the second or third generation American Muslims will be practicing any madhabs. As Hamid Mavani suggests “This will require allowing greater scope for reason and rationality in Islamic thought (i.e., a move toward the Mu’tazile theology and ethics), along with a good dose of intellectual humility, a critical mindset that allows for religious plurality, a non-judgmental attitude on matters of salvific efficacy, and revision of the seminaries’ curriculum used to train Muslim clergy.”
Prominent Lebonani Shi’i Imam of his time, Abd al-Husayn Sharaf al-Din al-Musawi (d. 1957) compiled a series of letters with the Sunni scholar and head of Al-Azhar university of the time, Al-Shaykh Salim al-Bishri al-Maliki during his visit to Egypt. In the letters, they debated Sunni and Shi’i beliefs in a very civil way which should be a model for the contemporary scholars on both sides. In his letter al-Musawi answers al-Maliki’s question of “why you (Shias) do not follow the sect of the majority of Muslims?” as “The generations of the first three centuries, then, never followed any of those sects at all. Where were those sects during those three generations, the best generations ever? Al-Ash’ari was born in 270 A.H. and died in 320 A.H. Ibn Hanbal was born in 164 A.H. and died in 241 A.H. Al-Shafi’i was born in 150 A.H. and died in 204, A.H. Malik was born in 95 A.H.1 and died in 179, A.H. Abu Hanifa was born in 80 A.H. and died in 150 A.H.”[15] I think this understanding must be cornerstone of the Islamic Ecumenism in the twenty-first century.
I truly believe there is a solid common ground where the foundations of global Islamic ecumenism can be laid among Sunnis and Shi’is. In the modern age, if Christian denominations and hundreds of sects within those denominations with significant theological differences can coexist and recognize each other as legitimate, Muslims who have the same testimony of faith and common articles of faith can and must come together establishing the ummah as commanded by Allah (SWT). There are ample proofs and factors that necessitate and facilitate unity among Sunnis and Shi’is. It is an obligation for us to stop the violence and bloodshed among Muslims for the sake of future generations and the sake of the honor of Islam in the world. Muslims, meaninglessly killing each other cannot promise ‘peace’ to the rest of the world. If nothing else, we must embrace each other for this reason.
Conclusion
In conclusion, I will try to capture some of the factors and point out some strategies in a possible Sunni-Shi’a rapprochement from my perspective.
- In the Quran Allah (SWT) declares that all believers in the world are one nation. The Quran and Allah’s Messenger thought us the pillars of Islam and articles of faith which both Shi’is and Sunnis commonly believe and recognize. They all testify that “there is no god but Allah, and Muhammad is the slave and the Messenger of Allah.” Therefore, Sunnis or Shi’is are all Muslims.
- The different sects and madhabs in Islam were established centuries later. The first generations for almost three centuries did not follow any of those madhabs. None of the madhab imams or Ahl al-Bayt imams meant to establish a different path other than Islam as taught by the Prophet. The teachings of the imams were much later doctrinized by their followers. So, there is no obligation to follow a madhab. A Muslim can follow any of those madhabs or choose not to follow any of them. We have no right to judge anybody’s faith. It is Allah who will judge all of us.
- Shi’i scholars must prohibit cursing of companions of the Prophet who did not support Ali in succession. On the other hand, Sunnis must understand that loving all the companions equally is not a condition for faith. Sunni scholars must also stop idealizing all the companions and turning a blind eye for their faults. I believe the corrupt governments in today’s Muslim-majority countries, as well as the ones in history, are because we did not manage to criticize the nepotism during Uthman’s caliphate (PBUH) and the corruption during Muawiya’s rule. Accepting and loving companions with their mistakes and human sides does not and should not diminish their status and their services in establishing and transmitting Allah’s religion side by side with the Allah’ Messenger.
- In this regard, Sunni clergy must also reevaluate its statist stance. The notion of obeying the rulers or statesmen under any conditions is wrong. This notion has caused moral and theological corruption as well as terrible oppressions, human rights abuses, and zulm throughout the Islamic history.
- Shi’i scholars must restrict extreme demonstrations of ta’ziya. Commemorating Karbala is their right and Sunnis feel the same way about those despicable murders, yet self-flagellation and torture are not a part of the religion, it is just a cultural custom that should be eliminated in the twenty-first century.
- Shi’is adding ’Aliyun wali-Allah’ to the athan should not be a problem for Sunnis since they also believe Ali was a wali of Allah. Allah’s Messenger praised him and his progeny, Ahl al-Bayt in numerous traditions which can also be found in Sunni hadith books. That is why all Sufi circlesconsider Him as their primary master in their tariqas.
- Any rapprochement efforts must be on a non-political, scholarly basis. The primary reason behind this divide was politics in the first place, as well as the reason why the previous rapprochement attempt failed. This can be done more effectively in the West away from Iranian and Saudi influence and then disseminated in the rest of the ‘Islamic world.’
[1] Quran 49:10, 3:110, 23:51-52, etc.
[2] Rainer Burunner, Islamic Ecumenism in the 20th Century. (Netherlands/Leiden, Koninklijke Brill, 2004), 19.
[3] Ismail K. Poonawala, In Shi’i Heritage- Essays on Classical and Modern Traditions, Edited by L.Clarke. (New York: Global Publications, 2001), 103.
[4] Ibid, 106.
[5] W. Montgomery Watt, The Formative Period of Islamic Thought. (Edinburg, University Press, 1973), 274.
[6] Rainer Burunner, Islamic Ecumenism in the 20th Century. (Netherlands/Leiden, Koninklijke Brill, 2004), 17.
[7] Ibid, 19.
[8] W. Montgomery Watt, The Formative Period of Islamic Thought. (Edinburg, University Press, 1973), 275.
[9] Rainer Burunner, Islamic Ecumenism in the 20th Century. (Netherlands/Leiden, Koninklijke Brill, 2004), 289.
[10] “The Amman Message,” The Official Site of the Amman Message, accessed April 12, 2020, http://ammanmessage.com/
[11] “Intra-Faith Code of Honor” Muslim Public Affairs Council, accessed April 12, 2020. https://www.mpac.org/programs/interfaith/intra-faith-code-of-honor.php#.UTaRJzBUU1I
[12] “Sunni Shia Symposium at UCI,” Shia Muslim Council of Southern California, accessed April 12, 2020. http://shiamuslimcouncil.org/sunni-and-shia-symposium-at-uci/
[13] Hamid Mavani, “Sunni-Shi’i Rapprochement: Internal Contradictions,” College Literature 43, no. 2, (2016): 133.
[14] I personally don’t believe the term of “Islamic World,” that’s why I am using it in quotes. Because, those Muslim-moajority states which are historically considered as “the Islamic world” have little to do with Islam. None of them uphold the human dignity, human rights, freedoms and properity of their citizens. Although some of them are called “Islamic States,” their governments are corrupt, their policies are oppressive, and they use Islam as a state ideology.
[15] Abd al-Husayn Sharaf al-Din al-Musawi, Al-Muraj’at, translated by Yasin Al-Jibouri. (Beirut: Imam Husayn Islamic Foundation, 1994), 19.
Bir Muhacirin Günlüğü 