Introduction
Both the Hizmet Movement (AKA Gülen Movement) and Ihwan al-Muslimin (Muslim Brotherhood) are global movements that have profoundly impacted their societies. In terms of their ideological backgrounds, organizational setups, their relationship with governments, and their influence in the global arena, they have many similarities and differences. In this paper, I want to compare and contrast these two movements in the context of their countries of origin. Turkey as the continuation of the Ottoman Empire and the home of the last Caliphate and Egypt as the leader of the Arabic world had similar post-colonial social developments. Although Turkey was not colonized militarily, it was colonized culturally just like the rest of the Islamic world. This cultural colonization deeply traumatized Muslim nations. Societies are broken into two segments; culturally Westernized minorities and conservative masses who see the West as the source of all sorts of evil for their misfortunes. In both countries, although the Westernized minorities consist of a small fraction of the public, they had control of the states.
Currently, both the Hizmet Movement and the Muslim Brotherhood are the target of massive oppression by their governments. In the aftermath of the coup against Mursi in September 2013, the Egyptian government declared Brotherhood a “terrorist organization” in December and initiated a witch hunt starting from the Brotherhood’s upper-level leadership and then widening the purge to lower domains. “In subsequent court trials, tens of thousands of people faced charges of participating in a banned terrorist organization, and many continue to be detained without a warrant or have been disappeared. Egypt’s twelve major-security prisons are filled beyond capacity, with prisoners languishing in substandard conditions.”[1]
Likewise, the Turkish government started a purge against the Hizmet Movement right after the corruption investigation targeting the cabinet members and Erdogan’s family was revealed in 2013. On December 17th, 2013, Turkey woke up with the news of arrests of dozens of people including sons of four cabinet ministers, municipal mayors, president of the largest state bank, and bosses of construction tycoons due to corruption charges. “Turkish police have arrested the sons of three cabinet ministers and at least 34 others in orchestrated raids that appeared to represent the biggest assault on the authority of the prime minister [Erdogan]. The detentions went to the heart of the Erdogan administration and included leading businessmen known to be close to the government and officials said to be engaged in suspected corruption, bribery and tender-rigging.”[2]
In the following days, Erdogan’s government immediately fired the police chiefs, prosecutors, and judges who took part in the investigations and named the operations as a coup attempt to the democratically elected government. Erdogan and state-affiliated media waged a smear campaign against Gulen Movement, naming it as a ‘parallel state.’ Although Gulen Movement affiliated government officials were Erdogan’s biggest ally and supporter against the ultra-secular Kemalist establishment during his two terms and he had appointed most of those government officials to their current posts, he accused them of ‘infiltrating’ into the government. In a conference organized by State Religious Affairs Administration in January 2014, Erdogan called the investigations as treason and called Gulen as ‘a fake prophet and phony scholar.’ In the following months, the Turkish Government started to seize the Movement’s schools, media outlets, and private properties and arrest hundreds of government workers, journalists, businessmen, teachers, and other civilians who were affiliated with the Movement with made-up charges. After the coup attempt in July 2016, the witch hunt on Gulen Movement turned into a social genocide with more than one hundred thousand people arrested and half a million people investigated for terrorism charges.[3]
Backgrounds of the Muslim Brotherhood and the Hizmet Movement
Undoubtedly, Hasan Al-Banna (1906-1946) was one of the most influential Islamic revivalists in the twentieth century not only in Egypt but also around the Islamic world. In 1928, as young as 22 years old, he achieved to start the largest Islamic revivalist movement that would profoundly influence the Egyptian society and state up until now. He joined the Hasafi tariqa at an early age and became an active member and the secretary of the Hasafi Welfare Society. Although he did not have any formal Islamic education, “he inspired his Brethren (Ihwan) with his ardor and sincerity; and his magnetic personality attracted an ever-swelling stream of adherents to his movement.”[4] He used his experience at the Hasafi Welfare Society in his own movement and tried to mold his movement as a social organization that is concerned with social welfare. This did not only recompense the government’s shortcomings in responding to the needs of the vulnerable part of the society, it also helped the spread of the Muslim Brotherhood’s popularity in Egyptian society.
Like his predecessors, Jamal Al-Din Afghani (1838-1897) and Muhammad Abduh (1849- 1905), Al-Banna also believed that “Muslim weaknesses and vulnerability to European domination stemmed from Muslims’ deviation from ‘true’ Islam. In order to revive Egypt, Muslims had to recommit themselves to understanding and living according to Islam as defined by the Quran and Sunnah, and as exemplified by the first generations of Muslims, the salaf.”[5] Like all other political Islamist activists, Banna also had a very negative image of Western civilization. He saw the West and colonialism as the mother of all evils in the Islamic world. Although he was an activist rather than a thinker like Muhammad Abduh or Afghani, his preaching profoundly influenced the scholars who came after him like Sayyid Qutub and Mawdudi (1903-1979).
The founding father of the Hizmet Movement can be considered as Said Nursi (1877-1960). Fethullah Gulen (b. 1941) or Hocaefendi (Master Teacher) as his followers address him, established the Hizmet Movement upon the teachings of Said Nursi. Unlike some of the other revivalists in the Islamic world, instead of accusing the West, Said Nursi defines three major enemies that haunt the Islamic world in his biography (Tarihce-i Hayat) as i- ignorance, ii- poverty, and iii- dissidence and/or animosity. Hizmet Movement is a movement of ‘emr bil ma’ruf, nehy anil munker’ (command the good and forbid the bad) that aims to fight against these three enemies.
The cure for ignorance is education. In the early 70s when Gulen was preaching as a government imam, with very limited resources, he started a few student houses where pious university students can stay together and practice their faith in the extremely secular university environment of the time. He also recruited a small circle of businessmen who were dedicated to support rearing a religious youth around those houses. Later these humble houses turned into small dormitories, and then small private schools where secular education was given. Unlike other orthodox Muslims in Turkey or elsewhere, Gulen insisted on secular education where natural sciences were thought in English. As a graduate of one of the first and most prestigious of those schools, we were taught religion in the after-school activities voluntarily, with no coercion at all. Later, these schools became the most successful schools in Turkey gaining international recognition. After the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1992, he sent his pupils and businessmen to Middle Asia and Russia to disseminate those schools. In less than two decades more than two thousand schools, dozens of colleges, several hospitals, and numerous cultural centers were started all around the world, in more than 150 countries from Mali to South Korea, from Nepal to Brazil. In most of the countries, those schools and colleges became the most prestigious educational institutions. Therefore, the Hizmet Movement is committed to Nelson Mandela’s notion that “Education is the most powerful weapon which you can use to change the world.”
The cure for poverty is entrepreneurship. Hizmet grew in a short time so effectively by means of businessmen who supported Gulen’s cause. Businessmen who were dedicated to Gulen’s vision not only provided monetary support for opening schools but also, immigrated to those countries where the schools were established imitating the companions of the Prophet (PBUH) after Him. Their network and cooperation in Turkey and around the world brought lots of business opportunities. In a very short time, they became prosperous contributing to the economic growth of Turkey along with them. A report that is published by the Platform for Peace & Justice states that the amount of wealth seized from Hizmet’s nonprofit organizations and from individual businessmen who affiliated with the Hizmet Movement was more than 32 billion dollars which is the largest amount of illegal wealth transfer in the history of Turkish Republic.[6]
The third enemy of any society is animosity. In order to fight with animosity, Hizmet promoted dialogue since its inception. Although the Hizmet Movement tried to avoid taking a side in the cold war between the secularists and Islamists in Turkey, it could not save itself from the detestation of both sides. Starting in the mid-90s, Hizmet started to organize interfaith events first time in Turkey. Through these events, the Christian and Jewish faith leaders were recognized by Turkish society first time in the modern Turkey. Later, Gulen visited Pope John Paul II, in 1998. Dialogue dinners, award ceremonies, and international trips from all over the world to Turkey had become a characteristic of the Movement around the world. When the secularist establishment increased its pressure on the government and targeted Gulen, he had to flee from Turkey in 1999. Since then, he is residing in Pennsylvania.
Ideological Backgrounds of the Gulen Movement and the Muslim Brotherhood
Although both movements ended up being targets of gross oppression in their countries, their ideological backgrounds are completely different. Muslim Brotherhood is a representative of political Islam that aims to revive society in a top-down manner by establishing an Islamic state. On the other hand, the Hizmet Movement is a representative of traditional Turkish Islam that is highly influenced by Sufism. Gulen Movement aims to transform the community in a grassroots manner through personal and social awakening by means of education. Political Islam in Turkey is represented by Erdogan’s Justice and Development Party (AKP). Hizmet Movement supported Erdogan against the secularist establishment in Turkey for his two terms from 2002 to 2011, when Erdogan claimed to have denounced political Islam after he and a group of others left Erbakan’s Refah Party in 2001. During the establishment of AKP, Erdogan had stated that “they have taken off the shirt of political Islam”[7]
In terms of their organizational set-ups, both movements are community-oriented movements that were organized in neighborhood chapters. Muslim Brotherhood’s wide grass-roots organization such as food aids and free health caravan services in the poor neighborhoods not only covered the government’s inadequacy in these areas but also provided support for the movement’s political goals. For example, during the 1992 earthquake, “with the regime nowhere to be seen, the Muslim Brotherhood’s web of organizations and services sprang into action. Within hours the group had made its presence felt among the victims, handing out food and water, providing shelter, and making medical services available.” [8] “Organizations able to command the support of disciplined and motivated cadres would gain a large advantage over their opponents in many spheres of activity, including political mobilization.”[9] On the other hand, the Hizmet Movement became popular in Turkish society for providing educational services to economically disadvantaged youth through student houses, dormitories, private schools, and scholarships.
The ideological differences between the Hizmet Movement and the Muslim Brotherhood also signify the differences between the traditional revivalist movements in Islamic history versus the political Islamist movements in the twentieth century. In his book ‘For the Sake of Allah’ Anwar Alam makes a differentiation between the classical mujaddidi tradition from Islamic reformist movements in Sunni Islam, associating the Himzet Movement with the former. For Alam, the most significant difference between the mujaddidi tradition of Islam and the Islamic reformist tradition [political Islamism or Islamism] is their approach to modernity. In the Islamic reformist discourse, the attempt is to ‘Islamicize’ modernity, whereas, in the tajdidi tradition, the attempt is to engage with modernity without compromising the foundations of the Islamic faith.”[10]
“Thus, whereas the discourse of Islamic modernists invariably results in adjusting Islam with the demands and value of modernity, in the revivalist tradition of Islam the attempt is to remain steadfast in practicing the normative ideal and essence of Islam within the dominant form of modernity. Thus, modernity does not become an ‘appealing object’ or a ‘threatening object’ to Islam in the revivalist tradition of Islam, unlike in the discourses of Islamic modernism, wherein modernity either evokes a ‘deep appreciation’ and a ‘wholesome imitation’ in the liberal version of Islamic modernism or ‘repulsion’ and ‘rejection’ in its radical, politicized version.”[11]
Therefore, The Hizmet Movement does not see Western civilization as a threat or a rival to Islam. For Hizmet, Islam’s theological foundations are firm and immutable and any theological, philosophical, or social engagement with the West can only benefit and enrich the Islamic world, just like it did in the second century of Islam when Greek philosophy was absorbed and digested in the Islamic civilization, or in the cases of Andalus and Ottoman Empire where Muslims lived along with Christian and Jewish communities without being threatened by their cultures or theologies.
Brotherhood’s second most influential thinker Sayyid Qutb had the same highly negative perception of the West. Although his education was Western shaped, and he was sent to the US by the Education Ministry for two years he saw the West “as a soulless, rootless, and empty” civilization. For Qutub, “at the heart of [the Western] moral system founded on such a belief lay a void.” [12] The same sort of inferiority complex and animosity (a kind of love and hate relationship) towards the West can be seen among the AKP supporters in Turkey as well. Although Turkey is a NATO member and a European Union candidate, AKP’s base believes the West, especially the US poses an existential threat to Turkey. The secularist opposition (which is as much anti-Western) or any sort of objection to AKP’s policies are automatically associated with the West and labeled as treason. When the lavishly large and unnecessary third airport was proposed in Istanbul, pro-government media propagated that the West was jealous of Turkey’s progress and was utilizing the Turkish opposition to stop the construction of the airport.
On the other hand, when criticizing Western materialism, Hizmet’s founding father Said Nursi distinguishes between the virtues and evils of Western civilization.
“It should not be misunderstood; Europe is twofold. One follows the sciences which serve justice and right and the industries beneficial for the life of society through the inspiration it has received from true Christianity; this first Europe I am not addressing. I am addressing the second corrupt Europe which, through the darkness of the philosophy of Naturalism, supposing the evils of civilization to be its virtues, has driven mankind to vice and misguidance.”[13]
Likewise, Gulen always has been a strong proponent of economic and political integration with the West and supported Turkey’s membership efforts for the European Union. “For Gulen, ‘it cannot be imagined that a devout person would be against the West,’ as the West became supreme following universally applicable rules and principles (shariat-I fitri).”[13] As opposed to the political Islamists, he approaches Turkey’s EU membership with similar degree of confidence:
“We should be comfortable in our outreach to the world. We will not lose anything from our religion, nationality and culture because of developments like globalization, customs union or membership with the European Union. We firmly believe that the dynamics that hold our unity are strong. Again, we also firmly believe that the Quran is based on revelation and offers solutions to all problems of the humanity. Therefore, if there is anybody who is afraid, they [the West] should be those who persistently live away from invigorating climate of the Quran. (2003)”[14]
That is why, when establishing the first private school in 1992, in spite of his conservative companions’ objections, he insisted the school would be an Anatolian school that is the type of school in Turkey where the education medium in natural sciences is in English. He envisioned a youth that would integrate with the West and represent the Islam in the West.
Muslim Brotherhood and Political Islam in general (or Islamism) is a reactionary ideology to post-colonial secularization projects imposed upon conservative masses in the Muslim countries. In Turkey, Ataturk (1881-1938), in Egypt Jamal Abd an-Nasser (1918-1970), and in Iran, Reza Shah (1919-1980) established heavily autocratic and fascist regimes that coerced Westernization and French-style secularization to their nations. Their shallow understanding of modernization did not include universal values such as human rights, Democracy, or freedom of thought. They thought they can ignite a renaissance, an enlightenment era in their backward nations by restricting religion in the social sphere and enforcing Western lifestyles and dress codes to their people. In his book ‘Secularism and Its Discontent in Muslim Societies,’ Nader Hashemi analyzes the reasons behind the animosity against the Western Civilization in the Muslim nations. As Hashemi stated, “in contrast with the West, the modernization is broadly associated with democracy, human rights, and pluralism, -in short social justice- in Muslim societies, with a few exceptions, modernization has been synonymous with the dictatorship, repression, and corruption -in short, social injustice.”[15]
Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, AKP in Turkey, and the Islamic revolution in Iran are the bitter fruits of ultra-secular, ultra-nationalist despotism, and dictatorship in those countries. Because they were born out of oppression, they always need an enemy or rival in order to survive and keep their relevance among their supporters. Although political Islam claims to be the exact opposite of secular despotism, it shares the same features with its nemesis, the secularist establishments. Indeed, their vision of the Islamic State is no different than the secularists’ nation-state, which was imported from Europe. This survivalist notion can be seen clearly in Iran’s constitution where the whole text was written upon the Islamic revolution and how it defeated the Shah who was serving for the interests of the Imperialist powers. After the fake coup attempt in 2016, Erdogan also established his new regime upon the hatred of the Hizmet Movement that according to him was serving the interest of the US in Turkey.
Like Anwar Alam, Tariq Ramadan also emphasizes the spiritual aspect of tajdid in Islam and defines two types of Islamic reform as transformational reform and adaptive reform. He explains the classical understanding of tajdid as “it was understood by the classical tradition of scholars and schools of law, is thus a renewal of the reading, understanding, and consequently, implementation of the texts in light of the various historico-cultural context in which Muslim communities or societies exist.”[16]
In Wael Hallaq’s words, these two types of Islamic reformists are defined as religious liberals and utilitarians. Hallaq believes that religious liberals insist on creating new methodologies whereas utilitarians merely try to add juristic devices.[17] In this context, we can define Hizmet Movement as religious liberal and associate it with Ramadan’s transformational reform, whereas we can define Muslim Brotherhood as utilitarian and associate it with adaptive reform.
We can see this contrast in their approach to democracy and secularism as well. From the very beginning, the Hizmet Movement has been pro-Western, and pro-democracy, and believed in Anglo-Saxon style secularism where religion is protected from the influence of government as opposed to French-style secularism where the goal is protecting the government from the influence of religion by restricting it in the public sphere. For Gulen, “Islam does not propose a certain unchangeable form of government, ‘instead, Islam establishes fundamental principles that orient a government’s general character, leaving it to the people to choose the type of government according to time and circumstances.[18] He argues,
“Democracy and Islam are compatible. Ninety-five percent of Islamic rules deal with private life and the family. Only five percent deals with matters of the state, and this could be arranged only within the context of democracy. If some people are thinking something else, such as an Islamic state, this country’s history, and social conditions do not allow it… Democratization is an irreversible process in Turkey.”[19]
This is a rare case where Gulen talks about an Islamic state in order to indicate such a thing is not possible in Turkey. Neither in his hundreds of hours of recorded sermons nor in any of his writings, he talks about establishing a state that would apply sharia. His statement emphasizes democracy as opposed to the Islamic state meaning these two concepts are not even compatible with each other as political Islamists claim.
On the other hand, for a long time, for the Muslim Brotherhood and political Islamists in general democracy was un-Islamic and not acceptable. In Turkey, Gulen’s statement that ‘there is no turning back from democracy’ caused strong reactions from Turkish Islamists. In a rally in 1997, Erdogan stated that “Democracy can never be a goal, it is merely a means for them.”[20] “In Ma’alim fi-l-Tariq Sayyid Qutb argued that anything non-Islamic was evil and corrupt, and that following sharia as a complete system extending into all aspects of life would bring every kind of benefit to humanity, from personal and social peace to the treasures of the universe.”[21] For Islamists, it took some time to accept and adapt to democracy as it became widely popular in the Muslim societies in Egypt and Turkey. However, their acceptance of democracy is a conditional one, as long as the society votes for what is ‘Islamic.’ For Yusuf al-Qardawi (b. 1926), the most prominent scholar of political Islam today, “For our discussion of democracy assumes a Muslim society, most of whose members ‘do realize,’ ‘do use their reason,’ ‘do believe,’ and are ‘grateful.’ We are not talking about a society comprising those who renounce the truth and go astray from the path of God.”[22] Their democracy is certainly not for a pluralist society, but only for a homogenous society as in the ‘nation-states’ of their rivals, the ultra-secularist establishments in Egypt and Turkey. Due to the influence of political Islam in the US, Islamic associations thought voting in the US elections might be haram because they believed democracy was un-Islamic until the 1990s.
Conclusion
The Hizmet Movement and The Muslim Brotherhood are among the most influential Islamic revivalist movements in the world. Although they have some similarities in terms of their organizational structure and the oppression they are facing today, their ideological backgrounds are totally different. The Hizmet Movement is a tajdidi movement in the classical sense that has its roots in Turkish Sufism. It aims to revive and refresh the Islamic faith in the minds and hearts of Muslims through education, charity, altruism, and social activism. It never had any ambitions to establish an Islamic state where sharia would be implemented, on the contrary, it is committed to democracy, secular state, and pluralism. From the very beginning, it respected the way of life of the Turkish secularists and defended the rights of all sects and minorities in Turkey. It does not see the West or Western values and lifestyle as a tread to Islam. Because of its pluralist nature, as a global educational enlightenment movement, (probably the largest) it managed to open schools all over the world and earned the respect and support of intellectuals and government officers from all religions and cultures. Although the Hizmet followers are quite pious in their personal lives, they are adopted and adjusted to modernity and professional life whether in Turkey or in the West.
It is unfortunate today that anybody who is associated with the Hizmet Movement is suffering a social genocide in Turkey that is perpetrated by a coalition of the Islamist government and the old secularist establishment. Turkish Islamists could not manage to establish their dream state where sharia would be implemented but they have adopted or rather metamorphosed into the guardians of autocratic state culture of the nation-state that was established by Ataturk and safeguarded by secularist establishment.
However, The Muslim Brotherhood is a political Islamist movement whose ultimate goal is to establish an Islamic state where sharia law will be implemented and anything that is deemed as un-Islamic would be prohibited. Political Islam and the concept of the Islamic State has no roots in Islamic history; it is an ideology that was born in the post-colonial era as a reaction to the colonial forces and their inheritors, the secular minorities in the historically Muslim lands. It was first inspired by Hasan al-Banna (1906-1949) the founder of the Brotherhood and later formulated by an Indian Muslim scholar, Abu al-Ala Mawdudi (1903-1979), and partly by the Brotherhood’s second charismatic figure Sayyid Qutub (1906-1966). The secularist establishments in the countries like Turkey, Egypt, and Iran tried to modernize their societies by coercing French-style secularism and European lifestyle which created animosity among the conservative masses against modernity and secularism, and the political Islam is based upon this very hate.
Indeed, the concept of the Islamic State is no different than the European-style nation-state with a twist of Islam. Typical to nation-states, political Islam also venerates the state’s authority and has little regard for citizens’ rights against the state. As it can be observed in the example of Turkey, political Islamists’ notion of democracy is rather an autocracy where the religion is controlled and utilized by the state and freedom of thought and human rights are curtailed. It is very unfortunate that the Muslim Brotherhood is also experiencing a brutal oppression in Egypt like the Hizmet Movement in Turkey in the hands of their soulmates, Egyptian secularists. In many cases, oppression begets oppression, and the oppressed become even worse oppressors than their oppressors. I hope this vicious circle is broken at some point and Muslim nations can taste much-longed peace after centuries of social turmoil.
[1] “Surviving Repression: How Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood Has Carried On,” Carnegie Middle East Center, accessed December 19, 2002, https://carnegie-mec.org/2019/03/11/surviving-repression-how-egypt-s-muslim-brotherhood-has-carried-on-pub-78552
[2] Constanze Letsch, “Turkish Ministers’ Sons Arrested in Corruption and Bribery Investigation,” The Guardian, published on December 17 2013. https://www.nytimes.com/2002/03/28/opinion/a-golden-reign-of-tolerance.html
[3] “Turkey’s Post-Coup Crackdown,” Turkey Purge, accessed December 25, 2020. https://turkeypurge.com/
[4] Ibrahim M. Abu-Rabi, Intellectual Origins of Islamic Resurgence in the Modern Arab World, (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1996), 63.
[5] David Cummins, “Hasan al-Banna,” in Pioneers of Islamic Revival, edited by Ali Rahnema, (Zed Books: New York, 1994), 133.
[6] Leighann Spencer, Ali Yildiz, “The Erosion of Property Rights in Turkey- In the Pretext of the State Emergency nd Counter-Terrorism Measures,” Platform of Peace and Justice, March 2020, 29.
[7] “Milli Gorus,” Wikipedia, accessed on December 25, 2020, https://tr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mill%C3%AE_G%C3%B6r%C3%BC%C5%9F
[8] Steven T. Brooke, “Winnings Hearts and Votes,” (USA: Cornell University Press, 2019), 51.
[9] Ibid, 7.
[10] Charles Tripp, “Hasan al-Banna,” in Pioneers of Islamic Revival, edited by Ali Rahnema, (Zed Books: New York, 1994), 166.
[11] Said Nursi, “Flashes- Seventeenth Flash: Fith Note” accessed December 28, 2020. http://www.erisale.com/index.jsp?locale=en#content.en.203.160
[12] Hasan Kosebalan, “Making of Enemy and Friend,” in Turkish Islam and Secular State, edited by Hakan Yavuz, John Esposito, (USA: Syracuse university Press, 2003), 177.
[13] Ibid.
[14] Nader Hashemi, “Secularism and Its Discontents in Muslim Societies: Indigenizing the Separation between Religion and State,” (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009), 133.
[15] Tariq Ramadan, “Radical Reform, Islamic Ethics and Liberation,” (London: Oxford University Press, 2009), 13.
[16] Wael Hallaq, “A History of Islamic Legal Theories,” (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1997), p. 213.
[17] Fethullah Gullen, “A Comparative Approach to Islam and Democracy,” SAIS Review 21 (Summer-Fall 2001), 134·
[18] Hakan Yavuz, “The Gulen Movement- The Turkish Puritans,” in Turkish Islam and Secular State, edited by Hakan Yavuz, John Esposito, taken from Gulen’s interview with Sabah Newspaper in 1995. (USA: Syracuse university Press, 2003), 28.
[19] Tayyip Erdogan, “For us democracy is a means, never a goal,” YouTube, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qY52kEMQyBA&ab_channel=MoonStarTV
[20] Wikipedia, “Sayyid Qutb,” from Milestones, 90, accessed December 29, 2020. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sayyid_Qutb#cite_note-66
[21] Yusuf al-Qardawi, “Islam and Democracy,” in Princeton Readings in Islamic Thought, edited by Roxanne Euben & Muhammad Q. Zaman, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2009, 241.
Bir Muhacirin Günlüğü 